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Lessons in L.U.S.T.: The Complete Story
of Liability for Leaking
Underground Storage Tanks
MICHAEL J. MAHER*
AND SHEILA HORAN**

INTRODUCTION

Hazardous waste disposal is extremely regulated by state and federal
laws. But hazardous waste sites are relatively few and may only present a
direct threat to persons who live nearby. Conversely, there are an estimated
two million underground storage tanks (USTs) in 750,000 different locations
with over 100,000 confirmed leaks.' Auto service stations with USTs may
present a more pervasive danger to public health than hazardous waste sites
because USTs can leak petroleum constituents such as benzene, ethylbenzene, polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons and other cancer-causing agents into
soils, groundwater, public utility vaults, streets, nearby basements and other
off-site locations.2 Based upon the widespread use of USTs and the
substances contained therein, in 1984 Congress passed a law specifically
concerning USTs and directed the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA) to promulgate regulations governing their use and
operation.3
* B.A., J.D., Northern Illinois University; Partner, McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White
and Farrug. Mr. Maher is a former prosecutor in the Illinois Attorney General's
Environmental Control Division and a former counsel to the chairman of the Illinois
Pollution Control Board. He is an adjunct faculty member in the Environmental Law
Program at the Chicago-Kent/lIT College of Law and a frequent writer and speaker on
environmental law. He is licensed in the states of Illinois, Florida and California.
** J.D., Northern Illinois University. Ms. Horan was licensed to practice law in the
state of Illinois in November 1996.
1. David W. Ziegele & Jay A. Evans, Regulating Underground Storage Tanks
Systems, 27 TRIAL 34 (Sept. 1991).
2. Benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene and xylenes are common constituents of gasoline.
Polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons are common constituents of diesel fuel, heating oil and
heavier grade petroleum fuels.
3. Michael J. Maher and Elizabeth Harvey, Liability Issues in Private RCRA Suits
Over Leaking UndergroundStorage Tanks, 30 CHEM. WASTE LrrG. REP. 4 (Sept. 1995).
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Before 1984, many petroleum tanks were already regulated by state fire
marshals.4 Likewise, many local fire departments regulated installation,
operation and closure of USTs as part of local fire and explosion prevention.
But it was Congress' 1984 addition of Subtitle I to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 19763 that created the first nationwide
duty to report and cleanup petroleum spills. Although Congress' regulation'
of USTs may have been good for the environment, Subtitle I created a huge
new class of regulated individuals now subject to federal laws and
regulations. 6 This resulted in a nationwide awareness of problems
associated with leaking tanks. One negative aspect of this new federal
program resulted from Subtitle I's regulatory obligations which sometimes
stigmatized former gas station properties by creating a record of "contamination" and a perception of lengthy clean-up requirements. Market values
were impacted as potential buyers (and their lenders) sought to avoid
properties with USTs.
Although Subtitle I sets forth extensive regulations, compliance
obligations were imposed only on "owners" and "operators" of USTs, as
defined by RCRA. As a result of Subtitle I, and citizen standing to enforce
RCRA, subsequent land owners of properties with USTs and neighboring
property owners (who were often impacted by off-site migration from the
tanks) gained a powerful statutory tool to enforce regulatory obligations and
address environmental hazards.7 However, citizen standing is limited to
enforcing the regulations or redressing environmental harm; RCRA does not
provide for recovery of cleanup costs, property damages, or other types of
injuries resulting from the use and operation of USTs.' Common law and
state statutory actions remain the best way to address "damages" issues.
The legal issues of who suffers the loss and damages caused by tank
leaks and who bears the costs of UST contamination are now being decided
by federal cases construing RCRA obligations and by state courts applying
traditional common law principles. Factually, two scenarios are generally
involved: on-site contamination of the premises (by current owners/operators) for their own acts or the acts of prior UST owners/operators at the site;

4. See, e.g., ILL ADMIN. CODE tit. 41, § 170 (1996) (detailing Illinois' Office of State
Fire Marshal regulations).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992k (1994).
6. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.10-.116 (1995) for federal regulations governing the
installation, use, operation and clean-up requirements associated with USTs.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1994) (providing citizen standing to enforce regulatory
obligations or address threats to environmental health and safety); see also Maher & Harvey,
supra note 3, at 4.
8. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
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and contamination that migrates off-site. This paper will first analyze the
law, regulations and cases discussing liability under Subtitle I. Thereafter,
certain state cases applying common law principles will be analyzed.
I. SUBTITLE I: RCRA LIABILITY FOR USTs
A. BACKGROUND

In 1976, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) to regulate disposal of discarded materials and hazardous
wastes. 9 RCRA's purpose was to empower the EPA to regulate hazardous
wastes throughout their lifetime, from cradle to grave. 10 Although the
1976 version of RCRA arguably included petroleum contamination via its
regulation of "solid wastes"" and "hazardous wastes,"' 2 Congress' 1984
addition of Subtitle I unambiguously directed USEPA to promulgate
regulations governing UST operations, use, release prevention, release
detection, release notification and clean-up obligations. 3 A "regulated
substance" includes petroleum and any hazardous substance,' 4 but does not
include hazardous wastes already regulated under Subtitle C of RCRA.'
RCRA's regulation of USTs is limited to only underground storage tanks,
as defined, 6 which does not include heating oil tanks or other specifically
exempted underground containers. 7 After public notice and comment, on
December 22, 1988, USEPA's federal regulations became final. 8 In sum,

9. Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305,
1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
10. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1590 (1994);
see also H.R. Rep. No. 94 1491, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6240,
6241.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1994), 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1995); see Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-n-Go
Foods, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D. Ind. 1992); see also EPA's Final Revised Guidance
Memorandum on the Use and Issuance of Administrative Orders under Section 7003.

12. 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1994), 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1995).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991(2)(A)(B), 6991(a), 6991(b) (1994).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1)(A) (1994); see also Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438,
451-53 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 6991 (1994).
17. 40 C.F.R. § 280.10 (1995). However, many states' local tank statutes include
heating oil tanks in their state definitions of USTs. See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/57.2 (West 1993, Supp. 1996).
18. See 53 Fed. Reg. 37,082 (1988).
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Subtitle I required that "owners"' 9 and "operators"'2 of "USTs ' ' 2 1 contain-

ing "regulated substances "22 notify appropriate agencies upon confirmation
extensive investigation,
of a spill or release within 24 hours. 2 . Additionally,
25
report writing 24 and clean-up were mandated.
B. "OWNERS"

As discussed above, all "owners" and "operators" of a UST must
comply with applicable regulations. However, the definition of "owner" is
two-fold, creating confusion in identifying the party responsible for
compliance with Subtitle I's requirements. Congress' definition of "owner"
is as follows:
(3) The term "owner" means

--

(A) In the case of [a UST] in use on November 8, 1984, or
brought into use after that date, [the owner is] any person who owns
th[e] ... UST, and

(B) In the case of [a UST] in use before November 8, 1984,
but no longer in use on [that date, the owner is] any person who
owned
such tank immediately before the discontinuation of its
6
use.

2

Although this bifurcated definition may be confusing today, it makes
sense when placed in historical context. On November 8, 1984, RCRA's
Subtitle I (regulating USTs) was scheduled to go into effect. Prior to that
date there were no RCRA regulations governing USTs. Apparently,
Congress surmised that for tanks in operation after the effective date of
Subtitle I, the current owner/operator should be responsible for regulatory
compliance, including leak detection, release reporting and clean-up.
However, for tanks already out of service when Subtitle I went into effect,
19. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(3) (1994).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(4) (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1) (1994).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2) (1994).
23. 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.50, 280.53 (1995).
24. 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.62(b), 280.63(b) (1995).
25. 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.60, 280.64, 280.65, 280.66 (1995). RCRA identifies financial
responsibility requirements for tank owners and operators, which must be complied with to
operate USTs. One of the ways to meet the financial responsibility requirements is the
creation of a state fund to help owners and operators pay the costs of remediating releases
of petroleum from USTs. For a discussion of one state's program, see Karen Rosenwinkel
& Michael J. Maher, Lessons in LU.S.T. - Cleaning up Leaking Underground Storage Tanks,
81 ILL. B.J., March 1993, at 140.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(3) (1994).
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Congress apparently sought to place the responsibility on prior parties who
used the tanks or owned the tanks while they were in use. This is unlike the
definition of "owner" in the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),2 7 which places responsibility
on the current property owner, irrespective of whether that party's activities
have contributed in any way to the problem.28 However, when one recalls
that CERCLA is mainly a cost recovery system, whereas RCRA is a "cradleto-grave" regulatory scheme, perhaps this dichotomy makes more sense.
Among its various liability provisions, CERCLA imposes liability (for
cleanup costs) on property owners whose property has suffered the release
of a "hazardous substance."29 Even though CERCLA imposes liability for
cleanup costs, it does not automatically require the property owner to do
anything other than report current spills or releases.3" In other words,
CERCLA does not impose an automatic clean-up obligation on any person.
Conversely, UST regulations contain clear automatic clean-up obligations
triggered by current releases of regulated substances (as in the case of
current owners and operators) or by the current discovery of past releases
resulting from prior UST operations (as in the case where the current owner
of property discovers a previously unknown, undisclosed, leaking tank, last
3
used by prior owners or operators). 1
Subtitle I makes no distinction between current releases versus past
releases, leading to the conclusion that clean-up obligations apply equally
to current spills and past spills. 32 Given RCRA's automatic clean-up
requirement, it is possible Congress sought to limit regulatory duties to
persons who either used the tanks directly (as current or former operators)
or were tank owners when the tanks were previously used. In any event, it
is more fair to impose regulatory duties on someone who had some nexus
to the tank, rather than someone who merely purchased the property years
after tank operations ceased. It is also noteworthy that Subtitle I was
enacted four years after CERCLA's blind imposition of liability on current
site owners, irrespective of whether the site owner contributed to the
problem. It is possible Subtitle I's bifurcated definition of owner reflects
Congress' recognition of the unfairness imposed by CERCLA liability.
Nevertheless, as a result of Subtitle I's definition of "owner," current

27. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1994).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1994).
31. 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.60, 280.64(a) (1995); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
32. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.10-.116 (1995). But see 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.73 (1995)
(Applicability to Previously Closed UST Systems).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

property owners with tanks used after November 8, 1984, are responsible for
notification and clean-up requirements. Conversely, current property owners
with tanks last used before November 8, 1984, are not responsible for
complying with Subtitle I's requirements unless they operated the tank when
it was last used.
In recognition of the bifurcated definition of "owner," one court has
allowed an action against a former owner, even though the former owner
vacated the site in 1975." 3 In that case, plaintiff alleged the tanks were last
used in 1975 by the defendant/former owner. Plaintiff alleged that this fact
and the bifurcated definition of UST "owner" rendered the defendant/former
property owner, the "owner" of the tanks, as defined in RCRA, even though
he vacated the site ten years before Subtitle I was enacted and twenty years
before the suit was filed. In this way, persons who sold property many
years before UST laws were effective may be the party currently required
by Subtitle I to perform clean-up. Although this may seem unfair, such
persons, as the last persons to use the tanks, actively participated in past
tank operations which presently require cleanup. At least RCRA requires
some action(s) by the former owner related to the current condition on the
land. This is contrasted with CERCLA's liability scheme, where liability for
cleanup costs is imposed on innocent parties who purchased the land years
after disposal occurred.
C. "OPERATORS"

Although Subtitle I regulations impose regulatory obligations on
"owners" and "operators", equally, not every UST operator is required to
report spills or undertake cleanup. In response to the apparent unfairness of
applying regulations to activities that ceased before regulations were
promulgated, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a RCRA citizen's action against
a prior landfill operator, whose.. activities terminated before the landfill
regulations were effective. 4 In Buch v. Guettler, an analogous case
involving USTs, one court has ruled that a tank "operator" who vacated the
site before UST regulations were promulgated is not the "operator" of the
tanks.3 5 In dismissing, the court noted that "[a] natural reading of...
"operator" indicates a present association between the operator and the UST
.. "36 The court held that if Congress had intended to regulate "past
operators," it could have clearly indicated an intention to do so. However,

33.
34.
35.
36.

1995).
Dydio v. Hesston Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. I11.
Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobile Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1989).
Buch v. Guettler, No. 95-50292, 1996 WL 377168 (N.D. III. July 3, 1996).
Id. at *3.
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policy statement, a parent who does not consent to adoption must be found
unfit before parental rights may be terminated.74 The evidence in the
record "did not demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that
[Kirchner] was an unfit parent."" The concurring opinion also found the
appellate court had improperly applied the "parental rights" rule of In re
Adoption of Syck, which required that a court must determine a parent's
unfitness before proceeding with a consideration of a child's best interests.76 Justice McMorrow ruled the appellate court had inappropriately
distinguished Syck based on several factors, including the age of the child
involved, whether the adoption judgment had been entered, and the specific
allegations of unfitness.7 7
The Illinois Supreme Court had the occasion to speak out on the case
on two subsequent occasions, in denying petitions for rehearing and in
ruling on Kirchner's writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Richard.78 In his
harshly worded opinion upon denial of rehearing, Justice Heiple lashed out
at critics of the court's initial ruling79 and reiterated the holding that
parental rights trump the "best interest" consideration as a determining factor
in child custody cases."0 Justice Heiple also observed the Illinois holding
in Syck is in line with the United States Supreme Court precedent set in
(citing 750 ILCS 50/20a (West 1992)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 186.
1990). The Syck court held:
76. In re Adoption of Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174 (Ill.
When ruling on parental unfitness, a court is not to consider the child's
'best interests.' ... At this point, it is the parent's past conduct in the thenexisting circumstances that is under scrutiny .... Only after a parent is
found, by clear and convincing evidence, to be unfit does a circuit court
ruling on an adoption petition proceed to consider the child's best interests
and whether those interests would be served by the child's adoption by the
petitioners, requiring termination of the natural parent's parental rights.
Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
concurring). "In my judgment, Syck is
77. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 184 (McMorrow, J.,
both controlling and persuasive authority in the present case." Id.
1995).
78. In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill.
79. See supra note 8.
80. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 188. Justice Heiple stated:
If [...]
the best interests of the child is to be the determining factor in child
custody cases, persons seeking babies to adopt might profitably frequent
grocery stores and snatch babies from carts when the parent is looking the
other way. Then, if custody proceedings can be delayed long enough, they
can assert that they have a nicer home, a superior education, a better job
or whatever, and that the best interests of the child are with the baby
snatchers.
Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
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s
Stanley v. Illinois."
In Stanley, the Court ruled on Equal Protection
grounds that unmarried fathers cannot be treated differently than unmarried
mothers or married couples. Justice Heiple, in reviewing Stanley and the
United States Supreme Court's subsequent rulings on cases involving
unmarried fathers, does not purport to rule on the federal due process
question of whether an unwed father retains parentage rights when he has
been prevented from establishing a relationship with the child. However,
the language of the ruling suggests that to deprive Kirchner of his parentage
rights in this situation would be constitutionally questionable."2 In the later
habeas corpus petition by Kirchner, the court, in a per curiam decision, ruled
that habeas corpus was the appropriate means for Kirchner to receive
custody of Richard and granted him custody of the boy, who had not been
turned over by the adoptive parents despite the high court's earlier ruling in
Kirchner's favor.8 3 The court reiterated the ruling of its earlier decision,
holding that the "best interests" analysis cannot be reached until a parent is
found by clear and convincing evidence to be unfit. 4 As a result, the
court held, the Does had no standing to seek the custody of Richard.
Similarly, the court rejected a plea by the Does and Richard's guardian ad
litem to analyze the case under section 601(b)(2) of the Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act, 5 which would have called for a custody
hearing upon the vacating of the earlier adoption. 6 And, finally, the court
also declined to grant the Does standing under a newly adopted amendment
to the Adoption Act, referred to as the "Baby Richard Law," which
mandates a custody hearing, to be guided by a "best interests" analysis, be
held promptly after an adoption is vacated.87 The court ruled that the
legislature cannot validly pass a law designed to change a decision of the

81.
see infra
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a brief encapsulation of these cases,
notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 333.
In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (II1. 1995).
Id. at 328.
750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 1992).
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 332.
Id. at 336. The amendment provides, in part:
In the event a judgment order for adoption is vacated or a petition for
adoption is denied, the court shall promptly conduct a hearing as to the
temporary and permanent custody of the minor child who is the subject of
the proceedings pursuant to Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act. The parties to said proceedings shall be the petitioners
to the adoption proceedings, the minor child, any biological parents whose
parental rights have not been terminated, and other parties who have been
granted leave to intervene in the proceedings.
Pub. Act 88-550, (July 3, 1994) (adding 750 ILCS 50/20(b) to the Illinois Adoption Act).
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such a limited reading of a health and safety statute is unusual 37 and may
not be consistent with Congress' definition of "operator" which includes
"[A ny person in control of or having responsibility for daily operation of
the... UST."3 The court's requirement of a present association between
the operator and the UST seems to ignore Congress' use of the word "any,"
which would seem to include past operators, current operators and possible
future operators. Also, unlike CERCLA, RCRA contains no statute of
limitations. 39 The requirement of a present sense association between
current operations and operator liability acts as a de facto statute of
limitations by eliminating regulatory liability by former operators once the
tanks are abandoned. Unfortunately, this may create an incentive by
unscrupulous operators to vacate the site without proper tank closure,
claiming that regulatory liability was severed once the site, and tanks, were
abandoned. That Congress intended to allow actions against operators for
past acts may be supported by the history of citizen actions in RCRA.
The original version of RCRA conferred standing on citizens to sue any
person, including any present or past owner or operator, whose activities
resulted in a public health threat. Based on the plain text of the original
language, past and present owners and operators were clearly subject to
liability for environmental threats. However, in 1984 Congress also added
a new provision for citizen standing. The new provision retained the prior
language (regarding past and present owner/operators) but also added new
section 7002(a)(1)(A), which conferred citizen standing to sue any owner or
operator alleged to be in violation of a law or regulation. 40 It is arguable
that Congress' 1984 addition of the word "any," as applied to owner or
operator, necessarily included "past or present" owners and operators
previously referenced in the statute. It is also arguable the Buch court's
ruling necessarily means there can only be one UST "operator," i.e., a party
currently using the tank.
The issue seems to be whether Congress intended that more than one
individual could be a tank "operator." If more than one person can be the
"operator," (as implied by the use of "any" in sections 7002 and 9001) the
Buch court's holding may be too limited. On the other hand, if Congress
intended that only one person could be a tank "operator," the Buch court's

37. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (lst
Cir. 1991) (holding that environmental statutes are to be liberally construed to effectuate their
purpose).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(4) (1994) (emphasis added).
39. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1255 (1996) (comparing CERCLA
statute of limitations provisions to lack of same in RCRA).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
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decision is correct. However, as a practical matter, in cases involving tanks
not used for many years, locating a culpable and capable "owner" may be
problematic. In such cases, the Buch court's ruling may unduly limit the
potential class of parties available to perform cleanup, even if contamination
is proven and ongoing. The Buch decision, which effectively imposes a
time limitation on actions for tank "operators" to clean up their contamination, may operate to protect persons whose past operations have resulted in
contamination. If such was Congress' intention, it is not clearly set forth in
RCRA.
D. RCRA LIABILITY FOR PETROLEUM RELEASES

As noted above, the two main factual scenarios in which UST liability
arises are contamination on the site where the tanks are located, and
contamination that migrates off-site. Unlike the discussion below regarding
common law, Subtitle I treats regulatory duties the same in either scenario.
If the defendant is an "owner" or "operator," as defined, that person is
required to comply with applicable UST regulations - irrespective of
whether the contamination is on-site or off-site. As a practical matter, if the
contamination is on-site, the two likely sources of enforcement are federal
authorities (or state authorities implementing the federal UST program) and
actions by subsequent owners of the site who discovered contamination and
seek to enforce cleanup obligation on prior site owners and operators.
Federal enforcement by USEPA of Subtitle I is specifically provided
for in Subtitle 1.41 Conversely, citizen standing to redress violations of
Subtitle I is not specifically provided for in Subtitle I. However, citizen
standing to redress environmental problems or regulatory violations
generally, is set forth at 42 U.S.C. sections 6971(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B).
Because Subtitle I contained specific provisions for federal enforcement, but
did not contain language specifically allowing citizens to enforce Subtitle I,
defendants have sought to dismiss private claims seeking to enforce UST
regulations. However, the courts have generally rejected this argument,
allowing citizens to enforce Subtitle 1.42 Thus, subsequent owners of
property with leaking USTs have used the citizen standing provision of
RCRA to sue past owners/operators whose operations have resulted in actual
41. 42 U.S.C. § 6991e (1994).
42. See Zands v. Nelson, 797 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Cal. 1992), modifying 779 F. Supp.
1254, 1261, 1263 (S.D. Cal. 1991); see also Agricultural Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v.
A.B.D. Tank & Pump Co., 878 F. Supp. 1091, 1095-96 (N.D. Il.1995). See generally
Dydio, 887 F. Supp. at 1047, 1049. But see Winston v. Shell Oil Co., 861 F. Supp. 713,
716, 718 (C.D. Il1. 1994) The Winston court's decision was abandoned in Waldschmidt v.
Amoco Oil Co., 924 F. Supp. 88, 92 (C.D. Ill.
1996).
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or threatened environmental harm,43 or when releases have triggered
regulatory obligations.'
With citizen standing having been established for subsequent owners
of the same site, neighboring property owners affected by off-site migration
of contamination should have little difficulty in establishing the required
standing. Thus, in the case of UST releases resulting in contamination
either on-site or off-site, RCRA provides a powerful tool that non-owners
and non-operators can use to enforce regulatory obligations or to redress
environmental hazards. However, for all its power, the relief available under

RCRA is limited.
In 1996, the Supreme Court rejected a current property owner's cleanup costs for remediating petroleum contamination from a UST.45 In
contrasting RCRA (which has no specific cost recovery mechanism) from
CERCLA (which is mainly a cost recovery statute), the court held RCRA
does not provide for recovery of cleanup costs when cleanup is completed
prior to filing suit. This was because citizen standing must be premised
upon either a current regulatory violation or a present threat to human health
or the environment.4 In Meghring v. KFC Western, Inc., because plaintiffs
completed the clean-up prior to filing suit, there was no present threat to
human health or the environment and no regulatory violation at the time of
4
filing suit.
The Supreme Court has held that environmental statutes do not provide
for citizen enforcement of past violations.4 In Meghrig, despite rejecting
plaintiff's claim for recovery of cleanup costs, the Supreme Court specifically
43. See Dydio, 887 F. Supp. 1037; Agricultural Excess, 878 F. Supp. 1091; Craig Lyle
Ltd. Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476 (D. Minn. 1995); Zands, 797 F.
Supp. 805; Dominicks Finer Foods, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 93 C 4210, 1993 WL
524808, at *1 (N.D. IM.Dec. 15, 1993).
Moreover, without specifically addressing the issue of standing, some courts have
allowed actions to proceed in UST cases, under the citizen standing provision of RCRA. See
KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996);
First San Diego Properties v. Exxon Co., 859 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D. Cal 1994); Buggsi, Inc.
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1427 (D. Or. 1994); Paper Recycling, Inc. v. Amoco
Oil Co., 856 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Sachs v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d
237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Triffler v. Hopf, No. 92 C 7193, 1994 WL 643237, at *1 (N.D.
111. 1994).
44. Dydio, 887 F. Supp. at 1041.
45. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1256 (1996).
46. Id. at 1254-55 (discussing plain reading and the intent of 42 U.S.C. § 6971(a)(l)(A)-(B) (1994)).

47. Id. at 1256.

48. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59
(1987); see Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1254-56.
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left open the question whether cleanup costs incurred after filing suit are
recoverable. However, even if the Supreme Court had allowed plaintiff to
recover his cleanup costs, plaintiff could not have recovered property
damages and lost profits via his RCRA action. Damages such as these are
not provided for in RCRA or CERCLA. Thus, plaintiffs seeking recovery
for such damages must rely on their state common laws or statutes.
II. COMMON LAW LIABILITY FOR USTs
As noted above, RCRA does not provide for recovery of property
damages or consequential damages by parties injured by contamination that
leaks from USTs. Persons seeking the recovery of such damages must look
to the common law or state statutes for relief. Unlike RCRA, the common
law seeks to construe reasonable conduct in a context much larger than a
regulatory system concerned exclusively with hazardous wastes or leaking
underground tanks. Consequently, common law cases discuss and define
what is "reasonable," applying such principles as "caveat emptor," "duty,"
"foreseeability of harm," "proximate cause" and various statutes of
limitations. Given the fact that RCRA imposes liability without fault on
regulated parties,49 it is not surprising that the results in common law
actions may differ from RCRA actions, even with identical facts. Common
law actions include contract-based actions as well as tort-based actions.
Contract-based actions, unlike tort actions, will usually involve actions
by present owners against their sellers because these parties are in privity of
contract. Similarly, because there is seldom privity of contract between
neighboring property owners, actions by neighbors will seldom involve
contract theories. Consequently, the following discussion of contract-based
actions for leaking USTs assumes an action by one property owner against
his seller.
A. CONTRACT-BASED ACTIONS

Generally, parties are free to contract however they desire regarding
conveyances of real estate. Given a buyer's ability to protect herself by
conducting a prior inspection of the land and by demanding specific contract
language, courts may be reluctant to find contract-based duties which are not
specifically set forth in the documents. Also, applicable statutes of
limitations for written contracts may be different than for tort actions. For
instance, many states recognize the so-called "discovery rule" in construing
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (1994); United States v. Allegan Metal Finishing Co., 696
F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Mich. 1988); United States v. Liviola, 605 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ohio
1985).
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the applicable statue of limitations for tort actions. Under the discovery
rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns
of the injuries. The traditional example is the scalpel found many years
later in a surgery patient who was unconscious when surgery was performed.
Generally, actions for breach of contract assume the plaintiff will learn
of the breach in a timely manner, such as in the case of shipping nonconforming goods or selling a home with a leaking roof. This may explain the
fact that "discovery rules" are generally not discussed in contract cases.
Thus, purchasers who do not discover leaking USTs within the applicable
(contract) limitations period may be forced to establish intentional concealment by the seller if the buyer learns of the contamination after expiration
of the contract statute of limitations. Actual, purposeful concealment would
require proof the seller knew, not only about the existence of the tanks, but
that the tanks were leaking dangerous chemicals of such a nature and in
such quantities as to constitute a breach of the sales contract, and the seller
intentionally hid this fact from the buyer knowing the buyer would not
purchase if these facts were known. For property sales prior to the
enactment of Subtitle I, it may be there were no clean-up obligations absent
a fire or explosion threat. Without a clean-up obligation, buyers may find
it difficult to establish the seller purposefully concealed a latent defect of
such magnitude as to constitute a breach of contract.
On the other hand, conveyance documents may contain a statement by
the seller that the property is in compliance with applicable local laws and
regulations. Many local fire departments have historically required proper
tank closure, either by tank removal or proper abandonment-in-place.
Generally, parties are charged with knowledge of the local laws regulating
their activities. In the case of sellers who also operated tanks, the failure to
comply with local closure (or tank removal) obligations may constitute an
ordinance violation. If the contract stated the seller had no knowledge of
applicable violations, the buyer's argument would be that the seller
misrepresented an important condition on the property (regarding tank
closure) because the seller is charged with knowledge of the local ordinance.
The buyer could claim the seller misrepresented the property's compliance
status by falsely (albeit not intentionally) representing the property complied
with applicable local laws. The buyer would claim that because he or she
was entitled to rely on the seller's statements about the compliance status of
the land, the seller's misstatement about the tank's closure status is a breach
of contract. The argument would continue that because tanks are buried
beneath the ground, the seller's breach was a concealed, thereby tolling the
applicable statute of limitations. Although this theory might work in the
case of a buyer suing his seller, the lack of privity between the buyer and
prior site owners/operators may significantly limit similar contract actions
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against predecessors in title - even when a specific event of contamination
can be established.
Another aspect of contract-based actions involves real estate contracts
promising to convey "merchantable title." At least one state appellate court
(Illinois) has held that a seller with actual knowledge of existing contamination breaches a contract obligation to convey merchantable title when the
cleanup costs approach fifty percent of the sales price.5" Applying this
case to a UST scenario, a federal court has upheld a buyer's right to bring
a contract action against his seller, when the seller allowed contamination
to remain (after removing the UST), and where cleanup costs were almost
one-half the purchase price.5 ' In so holding the court stated:
[Merchantable title exists where] persons of reasonable
prudence . . .would be willing to take and pay the fair
value of the land .... It is further defined as 'not perfect
title, but rather title reasonably secure against litigation or
flaws decreasing market value.' 52
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has rejected this approach in a similar
action. The Seventh Circuit stated the conveyance was "as is," noting that
most courts have refused to expand the marketable title doctrine to make the
presence of hazardous wastes an encumbrance on title.53 The Seventh
Circuit specifically refused to apply Illinois' pollution-related merchantability requirement.
Another important aspect concerning the applicable statute of limitations involves installment contracts. Some states provide a different
limitations period for installment contracts than for contracts generally. For
instance, under Illinois law, the applicable statute of limitation for breach of
an installment contract is ten years after the date of the last payment.
However, the statute of limitations for breach of a written contract is ten
years, period. Consequently, the applicable statute of limitations for a
twenty-year installment contract (providing for conveyance of merchantable
title) could be thirty years. This is because the ten-year statute of limitations
would only begin to run after the twenty years of installment payments were

50. Jones v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 592 N.E.2d 562 (II1. App. Ct. 1992).
51. Oechsle v. Pickus, No. 94 C 5936, 1995 WL 430946, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 18,
1995).
52. Id. at *4 (quoting Sinks v. Karleskint, 474 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)).
53. HM Holdings, Inc. v. Rankin, 70 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Pamela
A. Harbeson, Comment, Toxic Clouds on Titles: Hazardous Waste and the Doctrine of
Marketable Title, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 355, 378-382 (1991).
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completed.
examined.

Obviously, installment payment contracts must be carefully

B. TORT-BASED ACTIONS

As noted above, the two main scenarios involving leaking USTs are
actions involving contamination on the land, and actions involving migration
of contamination off the land.
Courts have resisted imposing tort-based liability on former owners/operators of real estate whose prior use of the site resulted in contamination. This may arise from the fact that even if Congress may statutorily
impose present duties for prior actions on the land (see above discussion of
RCRA liability), there is inherent unfairness in imposing common law
liability for cleanup duties that did not exist when the tanks were used. In
sum, if cleanup was not required when the tanks were being used, some
courts may say future damages were unforeseeable, in which case no duty
was breached. This conclusion may also flow from the subsequent property
owners' ability to protect themselves via site inspections and contract
language.
Conversely, neighboring plaintiffs seeking to apply the common law to
circumstances involving migration of contamination across property lineg
have done much better in asking courts to grant relief. This may reflect the
fact that owners or occupiers of property have very little control over
neighboring operations and usually cannot protect themselves from damages
by contract. Moreover, some courts have experienced less difficulty in
applying regulations retroactively when the plaintiff is a neighbor, as
opposed to a predecessor in title.
1. Negligence: Contamination on the Land
Many courts have refused to impose liability in tort for prior uses of
real estate, finding that prior property owners simply have no tort-based
duties to subsequent title holders. For instance, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island has ruled that the principle of caveat emptor governs the
duties of one property owner to a subsequent owner. 4 In Hydro-Manufacturing, the court ruled a former property owner's obligation to a subsequent
purchaser is mainly contractual, which affords purchasers ample opportunity
to protect themselves by negotiating a fair purchase price pursuant to an
inspection of the property. Likewise, caveat emptor is also the rule in
Florida, where an appellate court held that a seller of commercial property

54. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 955 (R.I. 1994).
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owes no duty to a successor in title because the buyer can protect himself
by careful inspection and price negotiation."5
In the context of UST cases, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that
a prior operator of a gasoline station had no duty to the present occupier to
avoid gasoline contamination. 6 In Rosenblatt, the purchaser knew the
property had a long history as a gasoline station. The court held the
purchaser should have conducted a thorough investigation if he wanted to
protect himself.
Likewise, a federal court has refused to interpret Illinois tort law as
imposing a duty on prior UST owners/operators to either disclose the
existence of a UST or remove the tank prior to sale.57 The Triffler court
ruled that caveat emptor controls the relationship of buyer and seller. In
Triffier, the plaintiff leased the property for seven years with knowledge of
existing service bays and gasoline pump islands. Based on these facts, the
court concluded that absent affirmative misrepresentations, a property owner
had no duty to future owners to refrain from certain property uses that
impact future owners.58 As regards misrepresentation, in a pollution case
not involving USTs, the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, approved
of a finding of fraud where a seller affirmatively concealed known
contamination prior to sale. 9
2. Negligence: Contamination that Migrates Off The Land
The "neighbor" cases differ from the "subsequent owner" cases in two
important ways. First, the plaintiff is different in the sense that caveat
emptor does not apply to adjacent or neighboring land owners. Obviously,
these neighbors lack the ability to protect themselves by site investigations
and contractual obligations -unlike buyers. Second, the claims by
neighbors tend to be more contemporaneous with defendant's operation of
the USTs, thereby avoiding problems of applying regulations retroactively.

55. Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 578 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991).
56. Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 642 A.2d 180, 188 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
57. Triffler v. Hopf, No. 92 C 7193, 1994 WL 643237, at *10 (N.D. Il. Nov. 4, 1994).
58. Id. (citing Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 100,
104-05 (D. Mass. 1990)); see also Wilson Auto Enters. Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp.
101, 104 (D. R.I. 1991) (holding that vendor's lessee had no duty to subsequent purchaser
to maintain property or refrain from activity affecting future owner. The purchaser bears the
risk of defects at time of sale and has a duty to inspect).
59. Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 955 F.2d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1992).
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Although courts have been reluctant to find a tort-based duty to
subsequent owners, this is not the case with adjoining or abutting property
holders. The general rule of property ownership is that an owner may use
his or her property for any legal purpose, subject to due regard for others.' °
The Restatement (Second) of Torts discusses the duty of one property owner
to a neighbor as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside
of the land for physical harm caused by a structure or
other artificial condition ... which the possessor realizes
or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of
harm, if
(a) the possessor has created the condition, or
(b) the condition is created . . . with the possessor's
consent or acquiescence ... or
(c) the condition is created . . . without the possessor's
consent or acquiescence, but reasonable care is not taken
of it.61
S.. after the possessor knows or should know
Because a UST is clearly an artificial structure on the land, the
Restatement would impose a duty on tank operators to act reasonably in the
use and operation of a UST. Instances where courts have imposed a duty
to neighbors for UST tank operations include: a duty to periodically inspect
USTs for potential leaks; 62 a service station's duty to avoid infringement
on neighboring ownership rights via contamination of groundwater; 63 a
duty to maintain USTs in a reasonably safe condition; 64 a duty to act upon
actual or constructive notice of UST leak; 65 and a general duty to act where
reasonable persons would foresee that property of another is at risk.' Not
all "migration cases," however, have favored neighbors. In one case

60. Dealers Serv. & Supply Co. v. St. Louis Nat'l Stockyards Co., 508 N.E.2d 1241,
1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).

61.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 364 (1965).

62. Lerro v. Thomas Wynne Inc., 301 A.2d 705, 707 (Pa. 1973) (holding that it is
reasonably foreseeable that a leak of large quantities of fuel oil involves a serious risk of
harm to neighboring properties).
63. Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1005 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
64. Leone v. Leewood Serv. Station, Inc., 624 N.Y.D.2d 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(contamination of groundwater foreseeable where UST owner failed to maintain tanks).
65. New York Tel. Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 473 N.Y.S.2d 172, 175 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984).
66. Nischke v. Farmers & Merchants Bank & Trust, 522 N.W.2d 542, 550 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that bank possessing a security interest in UST on landowner's property
may be negligent for failure to inform landowner the tank was to be abandoned).
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involving petroleum leakage, an Illinois court rejected a neighbor's claim of
leaking USTs, requiring that plaintiff identify a specific negligent act
because:
[S]ubstantial quantities of gasoline can, in the ordinary
course of affairs, escape from . . . a service station...
without negligence on the part of the owner or operator .... 67
As a practical matter, the problem with this ruling is that it ignores the
fact that property owners have little ability to monitor or control the tank
operations of their neighbors. Moreover, identifying specific acts of
neighboring negligence can be difficult in cases where the offending tank
operator remains, and impossible in cases where the offending tank operator
has vacated the site. The above court cited the fact that defendant's tests
showed tank leakage within the levels allowed in the municipal ordinance.
By simple addition of all the gasoline leakage the court deemed acceptable,
however, the yearly gasoline leakage was 550 gallons." It is hard to
imagine appropriate public policy as one where neighbors must bear the
costs of 550 gallons of gasoline leakage per year when a specific act of
negligence is identified.
Negligence actions require a wrongful (negligent) act by the defendant
resulting in damages. As discussed above, some courts may be unsympathetic to an impacted neighbor's difficulties in identifying a discrete and
wrongful act (or series of actions) that resulted in off-site contamination.
In the case of USTs used after Subtitle I regulations became effective, it
may be easier to identify a regulatory requirement which was violated (such
as release prevention or reporting) than to identify a single act which results
in off-site migration of contamination. In cases involving the violation of
statutes, regulations or ordinances, some plaintiffs have used the doctrine of
negligence per se, claiming that defendant's violation of applicable
requirements constitutes evidence of negligence.69 On the other hand, for
tanks last used prior to UST regulations, attempting to employ the current
regulations to prior activities raises the disfavored specter of retroactivity.
In such cases, negligence per se is unlikely to be successful. Likewise,

67. Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (I1. App. Ct. 1989).
68. Id. at 1004. The court refused to find that leakage of .127 gallons per hour was
negligent because this complied with the municipal ordinance's limit. Id. The court
disregarded testimony that a cup of gasoline was spilled during tank filling on an average of
three times per week because "[t]his amount of spillage was obviously so small as to be
insignificant." Id. at 1007.

69. Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 356 N.E.2d 93, 97 (Ill. 1976).
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depending upon the circumstances, some plaintiffs may make good use of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
3. Negligence Per Se: Contamination on the Land
In situations where a tank "owner" or "operator" fails to comply with
an existing RCRA or a state or local tank requirement, and that failure
results in contamination, it is possible a plaintiff may plead that defendant's
failure to comply with regulatory requirements constitutes negligence per
se. 70 Where a standard of care is set by statute, ordinance or regulations,
negligence per se may be established when that standard is breached. 7' In
one case involving USTs, however, a buyer brought an action alleging
negligence and strict liability for his seller's failure to comply with statutory
monitoring and testing requirements. 2 In denying plaintiffs action, the
court imposed a "knowledge component" to the regulations, holding that
plaintiff must show that defendant knew about the tank's existence.
However, as explained above in the discussion of RCRA liability, due to the
definition of UST "owner" used after 1984, an unknowing property owner
may still be the "owner" as defined in RCRA and thus be subject to
RCRA's regulatory requirements even if he/she did not know of the tank's
existence. This ruling may have been different if the case had been brought
solely under RCRA's citizen standing provisions.
Cases involving negligence per se often require courts to address the
"retroactivity issues." Because statutes generally apply prospectively rather than retroactively - plaintiffs should examine when the harm
occurred in relation to when the statute took effect. In denying one
plaintiff's attempt to apply environmental regulations retroactively, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that absent a clear indication of a
retroactive intent, environmental regulations would not be applied retroactively. 73 Ironically, although the court refused to apply the law retroactively, the court stated the statute would impose liability on future purchasers
harmed by contaminated groundwater. Thus, it appears Rhode Island might
allow an action in negligence per se in the future.
70. Malone, 534 N.E.2d at 1007. See State v. Giese Petroleum Equip. Serv., 94-3266,
1995 WL 490745 (Wis. Ct. App. July'5, 1995).
71. Robert I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, New Developments for Environmental
Practitioners in Hazardous Materials Litigation, C750 ALI-ABA 343, 351 (1992); see also
Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 356 N.E.2d 93, 97 (Ill. 1976).
72. White v. Long, 612 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
73. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950,.955 (R.I. 1994);
see also New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 163 (N.J.
1983).
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I Research has disclosed no UST cases involving the use of negligence
per se by a current property owner seeking to apply current regulations
retroactively against a predecessor in title. This can be contrasted with cases
involving off-site migration of contamination brought by neighboring
property owners, as discussed below.

4. Negligence Per Se: Migration of Contaminants Off The Land
Negligence per se in a UST context would involve the violation of an
applicable regulation or other local requirement, assuming the statute
involved provided for private enforcement. A Wisconsin court denied a
plaintiffs attempt to use Wisconsin's hazardous waste statute in an action
alleging negligence per se, stating the statute did not provide for private
enforcement.7 4
In allowing an action in negligence per se in a "migration case," the
New York appellate court applied a state statute retroactively against the
former operator." In that case the leak and subsequent harm to plaintiffs
property occurred nearly two years prior to the effective date of the statute
under which plaintiff sought recovery. Nevertheless, the court allowed
plaintiff to proceed on his claim, stating that the statute in question was
remedial in nature and merely expanded plaintiffs common law rights to
recover damages which existed prior to enactment of the legislation.76
The problem with negligence and negligence per se claims is they may
require the identification of a discrete, wrongful (negligent) act committed
by defendant, resulting in damages. Predecessors in title and neighbors both
suffer from the fact that they were not on-site when the wrongful or
negligent act occurred. As a practical matter, the ability of subsequent
owners and neighbors to identify specific acts of negligence is limited.
However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is designed to establish negligence in circumstances where the defendant has exclusive control over and
knowledge of the source of the damages.
5. Res Ipsa Loquitur: Contamination On The Land
Res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence when 1) the
occurrence does not usually happen in the absence of negligence; 2) the
instrumentality causing injury or damages was within defendant's exclusive
74.
App. July
75.
1995).
76.

See State v. Giese Petroleum Equip. Serv., 94-3266, 1995 WL 490745 (Wis. Ct.
5, 1995).
Leone v. Leewood Serv. Station, Inc., 624 N.Y.S.2d 610, 612 (N.Y. App. Div.
Id.
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control; and, 3) there is no evidence the injury was caused by plaintiffs
own actions." Research has disclosed no environmental cases involving
the use of res ipsa loquiturby a current property owner against a predecessor in title. This may be a result of the fact that res ipsa loquitur is merely
a means of establishing a wrongful (negligent) act - it does not create a
duty where none previously existed. In states refusing to acknowledge a
duty of property owners to successors in title, res ipsa loquitur should be of
little assistance because no duties are owed. However, in states allowing
negligence actions against prior owners, res ipsa loquitur may be a
plaintiff's best tool in establishing prior wrongful (negligent) actions.
6. Res Ipsa Loquitur: Migration of Contaminants Off The Land
Although it would seem that res ipsa loquitur would relieve plaintiffs
of the duty to identify specific wrongful (negligent) acts, research has not
disclosed many cases where this doctrine was employed. Research has
identified one case where a neighbor attempted to use this doctrine in a UST
case. However, the court refused to allow the desired jury instruction on
res ipsa loquiturbecause of uncertainty over whether the plaintiff's property
was the source of contamination.7 8 It is understandable that a court might
be reluctant to allow a jury instruction where the source of contamination
was uncertain; however, the court went on to state the following:
[Slubstantial quantities of gasoline can, in the ordinary
course of affairs, escape from premises where a service
station is being operated and travel underground to nearby
properties from the station without negligence on the part
of the owner or operator of the station.79
This last statement flies in the face of current UST regulations which
require leak detection, secondary containment and other methods to prevent
tank leaks.80 It is now known that leaks and spills can be prevented by
careful product transfer and careful tank operations. Thus, gasoline should
not escape from a tank in the absence of negligence. In all fairness to the
above court, its ruling was issued only months after federal UST regulations
first became effective and prior to that state's UST regulations being
promulgated. It is possible that the ruling may have been different if state

77. Bahrle v. Exxon Corp., 652 A.2d 178, 192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); see
also Cooper v. Whiting Oil Co., 311 S.E.2d 757 (Va. 1984).
78. Malone, 534 N.E.2d at 1007.
79. Id. (emphasis added).

80. 40 C.F.R. § 280.20 (1995).

NORTHERN ILINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

or federal UST regulations were effective at the time the spills or releases
occurred.
Ironically, the court's reasoning for disallowing an action based on res
ipsa loquitur may be a sound basis for imposing strict liability on owners
and operators of USTs. In sum, if leakage of stored flammable and
dangerous chemicals cannot be prevented in the exercise of due care - as
suggested by the above court - perhaps USTs are abnormally dangerous
activities to which strict liability should be applied. Conversely, if tanks can
be operated without leaks and spills, it would seem that res ipsa loquitur
would be a powerful, convenient legal doctrine upon which to establish
negligence.
7. Trespass: Contamination On The Land
Trespass is an unpermitted invasion in the right of possession." Some
states only recognize trespasses based on an intentional 2 or a willful
act.83 Other states would recognize a trespass based on: intentional
conduct, negligent conduct, or ultrahazardous conduct.8 In any event, the
heart of an action in trespass is an unpermitted intrusion on the occupier's
right of exclusive possession of the land. 5 Thus it may be that landlords
who lease the property to tenants may not have an action for trespass
because the landlord is not in possession of the real estate. Also, in cases
where permission was initially given to the defendant, the law imposes a
duty to remove previously permitted materials once the privilege is revoked
or terminates.8 6 Courts have been generally unreceptive to trespass actions
by the current owner of real estate against prior owners. In rejecting such
claims, the courts look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 161
which states:
A trespass may be committed by the continued presence
on the land [of something placed there by the prior
possessor] which the actor has tortiously placed
there ...

81.
82.
1995).
83.
84.
85.

87

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
Cloverleaf Car Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 540 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App.

Snyder v. Jessie, 546 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
Dial v. City of O'Fallon, 411 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Il. 1980).
Michael J. Maher, Common Law Liability for Underground Storage Tanks, 13 N.
ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 519 (1993).
86. Ralph D. Harris, Trespassing Pollutants: Use of Trespass in Environmental
Litigation, 29 ARIZ. Arr'Y, Dec. 1992, at 13.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 (1965).
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In a trespass action by one commercial tenant against a prior commercial tenant, a Maryland court rejected the trespass theory, holding that.
contamination occurring during lawful occupancy by the defendant was not
a tortious placing of contaminants on the ground."8 Thus, in the absence
of an original tortious placing on the land, an action in trespass would not
seem to lie. Agreeing with this theory, a federal court construing RCRA
and Illinois common law rejected an action in trespass against a prior
owner/operator of USTs, stating:
A prior land owner can simply not be held liable under a
theory of continuing trespass for items he left on his own
property. Nor can it properly be said that Exxon or the
other defendants acted "tortiously" by either introducing
or failing to remove the allegedly leaking tanks.8 9
Conversely, a California appellate court rejected this theory as
suggested in a summary judgment motion involving an action for continuing
trespass by a current property owner against a prior lessee of the property.
The court ruled that there was a question of fact whether the prior lease
restricted use of the land so that defendant's actions constituted a tortious
use.9

Although courts have generally rejected trespass actions by a property
owner against a predecessor in title, there are certain factual scenarios where
trespass may be the appropriate legal theory. For instance, in a real estate
transfer, rather than conduct an expensive accounting of remaining fuel in
USTs, the parties may simply agree that the buyer will pay a per-gallon fee
as heating oil is pumped from the tanks during the following several
months. In this case, leakage of the seller's heating oil which occurs after
the sale raises the question whether the seller (owner of the heating oil) is
responsible for fuel oil that leaked and remains in soils.
Likewise, some old gasoline station leases involved oil companies that
agreed to install tanks if the site operator signed a long-term lease. Some
of those long-term leases stated the tanks remained the personal property of
the oil company after expiration of the lease. (It may be that by retaining
ownership of the installed tanks, the oil companies sought to coerce the site
88. Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 642 A.2d 180, 188 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); see also
Wilson Auto Enters. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 101 (D.R.I. 1991) (Contaminants
leaked during lessee's leasehold does not support trespass claim. Right of possession
permitted uses within constraints of lease).
89. Triffler v. Hopf, No. 92 C 7193, 1994 WL 643237 at *7 (N.D. III. Nov. 4, 1994).
90. Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); see
also Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. Rptr. 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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operator to renew the lease, or undertake a new one, with that oil company
when the original lease expired.) In such a case, plaintiffs should consider
making a demand on the oil company for removal of the tank. Itis possible
a court might be willing to rule that the old, long-term lease establishes
ownership of the tank, and the failure to remove the tank (plus associated
contamination) might constitute a continuing, intentional trespass.
8. Trespass: Migration of Contamination Off The Land
In a UST case, the Supreme Court of Oregon has ruled that liability for
an unintentional trespass will not lie unless the defendant knew or should
have known that gasoline was leaking. 9 Irrespective of whether the
applicable state law requires intentional acts or allows negligence as a basis
for trespass, many plaintiffs will be required to establish a discrete, specific
act (or acts) in order to establish trespass - assuming res ipsa loquitur is
unavailable. Given the difficulties identified above, it may be impossible
for plaintiffs to identify any specific negligent or intentional acts. However,
there may be a way to avoid this problem under the theory of continuing
intentional trespass.
In factual circumstances where the migration can be traced to
defendant's property, plaintiff should make a written demand that defendant
remove the "materials" from plaintiffs property.92 Once a demand for
removal is ignored, plaintiff can argue that defendant's continued refusal to
remove defendant's "materials" manifests a purposeful intent to commit
intentional continuing trespass. Plaintiff can argue this is tantamount to
defendant's purposefully using plaintiff's property as a "disposal" site for
defendant's toxic substances 93 without permission and despite plaintiff's
demand for removal. Plaintiff can then argue this is analogous to a failure
to remove an offending structure on the land after plaintiff's consent is
terminated. The advantage of this approach is it closely tracks the
Restatement language set forth above and also dovetails nicely with
Prosser's definition of intentional continuing trespass:

91. Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175 (Or. 1977).
92. Establishing that the materials originated from the defendant may be easy if the
defendant has contacted the appropriate state agency to report a petroleum release. Otherwise
establishing the direction of flow may be done via groundwater testing or local state
geological data.
93. Plaintiff will want to cite Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d
837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992) and Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-n-Go, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D. Ind.
1992) for the proposition that abandonment of wastes constitutes active disposal.
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But in many cases, as where the defendant . . dumps
rubbish on the land of the plaintiff,
the invasion is
94
continued by a failure to remove it.
Research has disclosed no reported appellate cases involving this
theory. Nevertheless this author has twice used this approach successfully,
in motions for summary judgment. Neither case was appealed.
9. Nuisance: Contamination On The Land
A trespass is a violation of the right of exclusive possession which
generally requires an actual physical intrusion onto plaintiff's property. A
nuisance, on the other hand, is an unreasonable interference with use and
enjoyment of real estate 95 which requires a substantial and unreasonable
interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land.9 Nuisances
are either private or public. A private nuisance traditionally involves
conflicts between neighbors, where offensive conduct originates beyond the
boundaries of the plaintiff's property.97 A public nuisance involves an
unreasonable interference with a public right. 98 A private individual's
standing to pursue damages from a public nuisance is limited to situations
where the plaintiff suffers a particular injury, distinctive from the public
injury.99 It is widely recognized that gasoline or fuel storage tanks do not
generally constitute a nuisance per se.'°°
Generally, a subsequent owner or property cannot bring an action in
nuisance against a prior owner for contamination that occurred during the
prior owner's possession of the land.' One court has gone so far as to
rule that absent a fraudulent concealment by seller, the principle of caveat

94. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§

13, at

83 (5th ed. 1984).
95. Jack W. Shaw, Annotation, Gasoline or Other Fuel Storage Tanks as Nuisance,
50 A.L.R.3d 209 (1973).
96. Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
97. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 957 (R.I. 1994).
98. Id.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1965); see also Hydro-Manufacturing,
640 A.2d at 957.
100. Shaw, supra note 95, at 209.
101. Hydro-Manufacturing,640 A.2d at 957; see also Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 98 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying Massachusetts law); Hanlin
Group, Inc. v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 935 (D. Me. 1990);
55 Motor Ave. Co. v. Liberty Indus. Finishing Corp., 885 F. Supp. 410, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(applying N.Y. law); Triffler, 1994 WL 643237, at *10 (applying Illinois law).
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emptor precludes actions against prior owners of the property.' 2 Conversely, in recognizing that California nuisance is a creature of statute rather than a creature of common law - one California court has allowed
an action by a current owner against a prior owner of real estate. While
acknowledging that nuisance actions traditionally require damaging conduct
between contemporaneous neighbors, California's Mangini court rejected a
requirement that the defendant presently hold an interest in the source of the
unlimited;
alleged nuisance. However, California's nuisance law is not
03
lawful actions by prior land owners may constitute a defense.'
10. Nuisance: Migration of Contamination Off The Land
The Supreme Court of Iowa has construed nuisance in the context of
a UST "migration case," holding that migration of gasoline contamination
across property lines can constitute a nuisance under Iowa law. 04 The
court further held that the proper measure of damages for a nuisance that
results from contamination of property for an indefinite period of time is the
diminution of fair market value of the property.0 5
In another "migration case" involving petroleum leakage from a UST,
the Maryland appellate court approved awarding of nuisance damages,
stating plaintiff's use of the property was substantially interfered with, even
if the defendant did not physically touch plaintiff's property. The court
ruled that plaintiffs use and enjoyment of the property was substantially
interfered with because plaintiff could not sell the land, could not build upon
the land and could not drink the water.
11. Strict Liability: Contamination On The Land
Some activities are so dangerous they cannot be made safe by the exercise
of due care. The doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity
arises in circumstances where the activity involved is so inherently dangerous
that it cannot be made safe.'0 6 The key to this theory of liability is the
activity - not the dangerous nature of the substances involved." 7 Thus,
102. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 1985)
(applying Pennsylvania law).
103. Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 834; see also Newhall Land, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383
(finding no consent defenses between owner and subsequent purchaser).
104. Mel Foster Co. Properties, Inc. v. American Oil Co., 427 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Iowa
1988).
105. Id.
106. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
107. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th
Cir. 1990).
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flammable fuels containing cancer-causing ingredients should not give rise
to strict liability if the activity of fuel storage can be done safely - even if
the stored chemicals will never be safe for human consumption. The main
test currently used to determine whether an activity is so inherently
dangerous that it gives rise to strict liability is the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 520's following factors:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk
of harm to others or their property;
Whether the harm which may result will be great;
Whether the risk can be eliminated by due care;
Whether the activity is a matter of common usage;
Whether the activity is appropriate to the location where
it is located; and,
The activity's value to the community.' 8

While all the above factors need not be present for an activity to be
unduly dangerous, "a" and "e" are considered the most important factors."
In explaining the importance of factors "a" and "e," Commentj to Section 520,
above, states that storage of large quantities of a highly flammable liquid, like
gasoline, may become an abnormally dangerous activity if conducted in the
midst of a heavily populated city." 0 In sum, the theory of strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities seems premised on the policy that activities
that are so dangerous they cannot be made safe should be moved to a location
where they cannot cause damage; otherwise all injuries caused will result in
strict liability."' Although the Restatement approach makes sense, it is
questionable whether the Restatement's reliance on location is important. For
instance, to an aggrieved neighbor who can show migration of hazardous
chemicals resulting in damages, what difference does it make if the aggrieved
plaintiff and the defendant happen to be located in a residential area - the
damages still exist.
Whether courts will allow an action in strict liability against a
predecessor in title often depends upon the status of the caveat emptor
doctrine in that state. In states where caveat emptor is the rule, few
common law actions against prior owners have been successful, irrespective
of the legal theory employed. Conversely, in states where caveat emptor is

108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976).
109. See Maher, supra note 85.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j (1976).
111. Maher, supra note 85, at 529.
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not the rule, sellers may not be able to escape the 2consequences of their
abnormally dangerous actions - even by contract."
The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed a current property owner to
proceed in a strict liability action against a prior owner who left Poly
Chlorinated Biphenyl (PCBs) on land before it was sold. In so doing, the
New Jersey court extended the law of strict liability to cases involving: 1)
a seller's failure to disclose a known, unreasonable risk; 2) a buyer with no
reason to know of the risk; and 3) a seller who knew the buyer was
unaware. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the buyer's
ignorance of the abnormally dangerous condition,(the presence of PCBs) to
preempt the doctrine of caveat emptor - even though the property was sold
"as is." It is suggested that New Jersey's approach will remain the minority
view.
12. Strict Liability: Migration of Contamination Off The Land
Some states simply reject the notion of strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activity, thereby precluding such actions."13 Other states,
adopting analyses similar to the Restatement, have focused on the location
of the USTs in holding that petroleum tanks may constitute abnormally
dangerous activities. ' 4 Other states have simply allowed UST actions for
strict liability to proceed, using the fact' that petroleum is highly flammable
and explosive." 5 In a 1972 opinion, the Washington Supreme Court ruled
that transporting gasoline as freight on the highway is an abnormally
dangerous activity." 6
In a UST case, a federal district court recently ruled that UST leaks are
preventable with care, 1 7 but went on to consider the Restatement's
"location" criteria in deciding whether use and operation of USTs was an
abnormally dangerous activity. That court held that a gasoline station
112. Albert G. Besser, Caveat Emptor - Where Have You Gone?, 4 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J.
203 (1992); Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 642 A.2d 180 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); see
Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 100 (D. Mass. 1990);
Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 578 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
113. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 958 (R.I. 1994).
114. Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1005 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); see also
Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969).
115. City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1981).
116. Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972).
117. Dominicks Finer Foods, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 93 C 4210, 1993 WL 524808,
at *1 (N.D. I11.Dec. 15, 1993). This statement is noteworthy because this federal district
court was applying Illinois common law, which is the same state whose appellate court
previously ruled that leaks of gasoline can occur and migrate off-site without any act of
negligence. See Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (III. App. Ct. 1989).
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located adjacent to a retail mall in a commercial setting was substantially
less likely to cause great harm than if the tanks were in a residential setting;
thus, the tanks were not inappropriate to the location where they were
located."' The court concluded that USTs did not constitute an abnormally dangerous activity, giving rise to strict liability. As noted above, the
difficulty with this decision is that the status of the plaintiff (residential
versus commercial) is a critical factor in whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous. This factor seems to swallow the (previously) critical issue of
whether the activity in question can be done safely.
Traditionally, if the activity could be done safely, the activity was not
abnormally dangerous such that strict liability would apply. As a practical
matter, if the activity could not be done safely (whether it involved
harboring wild animals or blasting explosives) that activity was abnormally
dangerous, irrespective of the status of the defendant. In truth, to a neighbor
whose land suffers the migration of flammable, toxic substances, the
damages are real and the defendant's activity giving rise to the damages
(operation of USTs) is no different in a residential setting than in a
commercial setting. The only difference is the courts' willingness to draw
a distinction between similar damages, based upon the status of the
defendants. In sum, it appears adjacent residential neighbors will fare better
than adjacent industrial neighbors when petroleum leaks from a nearby UST
and migrates across property lines.
CONCLUSION

RCRA provides a powerful tool to force owners and operators of USTs
containing regulated substances to perform whatever cleanup is required.
This tool is identical irrespective of whether the contamination is on the land
where the tanks are located or whether it migrates off-site. However, RCRA
does not provide for recovery of consequential damages. The common law
provides for consequential damages, but it is generally unreceptive in cases
involving actions between successive property owners. In actions between
neighbors, the common law is more accommodating of plaintiffs, but often
requires the showing of a specific act of negligence. Future uses of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may assist future plaintiffs in this regard.
Negligence per se can provoke judicial discomfort with the attempt to apply
current standards retroactively; however, at least one court has done so. It
is likely negligence per se will be more successful in cases involving tanks
used after RCRAs or applicable state regulations became effective. Trespass
and nuisance actions will generally be more successful by neighbors, with
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520e (1976).
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continuing intentional nuisance being one possible way to avoid the
difficulty of identifying a specific act of negligence. Finally, strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities has been applied by some courts, but the
current trend seems to be contrary. In adopting the Restatement's approach
regarding this legal theory, courts seem to be focusing on the status of the
plaintiff, rather than the activity in question.

